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Corporate Friction: How Corporate Law Impedes American Progress and What To 
Do About It by David Yosifon 
Abstract 
David Yosifon's first book, Corporate Friction: How Corporate Law Impedes American Progress and What 
To Do About It, provides a unique perspective on the corporate purpose debate. The corporate purpose 
debate can be summarized as a search for the answer to a seemingly rudimentary question: “For Whom 
is the Corporation Managed”? Yosifon presents a well-researched argument that U.S. corporations should 
be managed for the best interest of stakeholders, opposed to shareholders. This distinction is known as 
the shareholder-stakeholder best-interest trade-of. Yosifon supports his argument with a refned analysis 
of the assumptions and norms that have led to a shareholder-centric model of corporate governance in 
the United States and its impact on “American progress.” 




Corporate Friction: How Corporate Law 
Impedes American Progress and What To 
Do About It by David Yosifon1 
 
CAMERON TESCHUK2 
DAVID YOSIFON’S FIRST BOOK, Corporate Friction: How Corporate Law Impedes 
American Progress and What To Do About It, provides a unique perspective on 
the corporate purpose debate. Te corporate purpose debate can be summarized 
as a search for the answer to a seemingly rudimentary question: “For Whom 
is the Corporation Managed”?3 Yosifon presents a well-researched argument 
that U.S. corporations should be managed for the best interest of stakeholders, 
opposed to shareholders. Tis distinction is known as the shareholder-stakeholder 
best-interest trade-of. Yosifon supports his argument with a refned analysis 
of the assumptions and norms that have led to a shareholder-centric model of 
corporate governance in the United States and its impact on “American progress.” 
Yosifon’s focus on “American progress” is simultaneously too restrictive 
and too vague for the subject matter it covers. Yosifon’s discussion of America’s 
shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance is in no way restricted in 
its application to the American debate surrounding the shareholder-stakeholder 
1. (Cambridge University Press, 2018) [Corporate Friction]. 
2. B.Comm (Hons) (2017), University of Manitoba; JD Candidate (2021), Osgoode Hall Law 
School; MBA Candidate (2021), Schulich School of Business. 
3. See Tom Vos, “Te Corporate Purpose Debate(s) under the Spotlight” European Corporate 
Governance Institute (23 September 2020), online: <ecgi.global/news/corporate-purpose-
debates-under-spotlight> (summarizing diferent perspectives in the corporate 
purpose debate). 






best-interest trade-of in corporate legal theory. Save for an extended discussion 
of American patriotism and the odd baseball reference, Yosifon’s overview of 
the academic and jurisprudential history of the corporate purpose dilemma 
and his recommended changes are equally relevant for any student, politician, 
practitioner, or corporate legal scholar, regardless of where their personal opinion 
falls along the shareholder-stakeholder primacy spectrum. 
Where Yosifon’s work leaves more to be desired, however, is in its defnition 
and discussion of progress. Progress, in the context of corporate regulation, can 
encapsulate a wide array of objectives, ranging from social, environmental, 
psychological, and political, to economic. Despite Yosifon’s early assertion 
that he would provide a theoretical case for the American shareholder-primacy 
model, which as he notes, is predominantly driven by economic objectives, that 
is “so fairly presented, the reader may be convinced,” his theoretical case for 
abandoning America’s shareholder-primacy model includes minimal discussion 
of economic objectives.4 Instead, Yosifon’s defnition of progress is restricted 
to social, environmental, and political progress, with minimal discussion of 
potential negative impacts on economic progress. 
Tis assertion is, in no way, meant to minimize the contribution that 
Yosifon’s work makes to corporate legal theory. Yosifon utilizes a wide array 
of political and sociological theory, ranging from Adam Smith5 to Sigmund 
Freud,6 to develop a strong picture of the ideologies and normative realities 
that make up the infrastructure and issues of America’s shareholder-centric 
corporate governance system. In fact, many of Yosifon’s ideas were seemingly 
adopted by the Business Roundtable following the publication of Yosifon’s book.7 
In a highly publicized statement in 2019, a group of 181 CEOs from leading 
U.S. companies publicly committed to move away from a shareholder-primacy 
model of corporate governance and instead “lead their companies for the beneft 
of all stakeholders.”8 Tis is not, however, the end of the debate. A distinction 
has to be made between Yosifon’s work and the Business Roundtable Statement. 
4. See Yosifon, supra note 1 at 5. 
5. Ibid at 14, 23, 30. 
6. Ibid at 105. 
7. Te Business Roundtable is an association of business leaders from America’s leading 
corporations. See Business Roundtable, “About Us” (last visited 19 November 2020), online: 
<www.businessroundtable.org/about-us>. 
8. Business Roundtable, “Business Roundtable Redefnes the Purpose of a Corporation to 














TESCHUK, CORPORATE FRICTION 217 
Yosifon is not just arguing that corporations should act in the best interest of all 
stakeholders, but that directors should have a legal duty to act in the best interest 
of stakeholders.9 
A jump from a discussion of the problems with the current system to a 
recommendation that America should adopt a stakeholder-primacy legal 
system of governance, as Yosifon argues,10 requires a more signifcant discussion 
of the economic-sociological trade-of than is present in Corporate Friction. 
Accordingly, Yosifon’s work reads more as a well-researched counter-piece to 
the predominantly shareholder- and economic-centric literature in American 
corporate legal theory than as a stand-alone piece that can convince a reader (or 
regulator) that the United States should abandon its shareholder-centric model 
of corporate governance in favour of a regulatory framework that promotes the 
interest of all stakeholders. 
My tendency to emphasize the limitations of Yosifon’s argument, which stem 
from a lack of economic analysis, may refect my own personal bias as to the 
appropriate balance of efectively weighing economic and social trade-ofs in the 
corporate governance debate. On this point, I would like to borrow a sentiment 
from Yosifon directly, that the highest form of fattery in academia is not 
imitation, but rather critique.11 Yosifon’s stakeholder-primacy solution presented 
in Corporate Friction and his criticism of the shareholder-centric approach 
present a strong argument in support of the need for changes in America’s 
corporate governance framework. I hope that my own criticism of Yosifon’s 
proposed solution is read, not as an assertion that his stakeholder-primacy model 
is unachievable, but rather that it is insufciently supported based solely on the 
arguments presented in Corporate Friction. 
Yosifon’s primary argument is that “the law presently requires directors to 
work ‘hard and honestly’ on behalf of shareholders.”12 We should say instead, 
he continues, that directors should “work hard and honestly on behalf of all 
corporate stakeholders.”13 Te defnition of other “stakeholders,” which Yosifon 
purposefully does not restrict, includes, in addition to shareholders: employees, 
consumers, the environment, and the nation.14 Yosifon’s argument that corporate 
directors should have a legal duty to act in the best interest of all stakeholders, 
9. Yosifon, supra note 1 at 175-76. 
10. Ibid at 175-78. 
11. Ibid at 71. 
12. Ibid at 175. 
13. Ibid at 175-76. 
14. Ibid at 180. 








as opposed to just shareholders, is on its face, relatively straightforward, and 
not particularly novel amongst left-leaning corporate legal scholars.15 Te 
predominant debate surrounding corporate governance scholarship, and the 
central focus of Yosifon’s work, instead lies in the establishment of the underlying 
premises and assumptions that support this claim. 
Te standard logic of any argument to expand the breadth of corporate director 
duties to consider the best interest of stakeholders other than shareholders can be 
simplifed as follows. Te initial premise is that the current law requires directors 
to focus only on shareholders’ wealth-maximization.16 Taking this as a starting 
point, it must then be established that the model creates negative externalities 
as corporations create additional costs that are not borne by shareholders.17 Te 
strongest aspects of Corporate Friction are Yosifon’s establishment of each of these 
premises, and the disputes with scholarly attempts to undermine them. Te more 
challenging assertion to establish is that these negative externalities should be 
mitigated by imposing a legal duty on directors to equally weigh the interests of 
external stakeholders. Tis raises the question of whether a legal duty, enforced 
via director liability, is the best method of mitigating the negative externalities 
borne by external stakeholders. 
To support this conclusion, two key assumptions need to be proven. 
First, it must be shown that the reduction of negative externalities to external 
stakeholders are not ofset by equal or greater negative economic externalities, 
such as reduced job creation, higher costs of capital, or increased litigation under 
the stakeholder-primacy model. Second, it must be established that there are 
no alternative mechanisms to reduce the negative externalities that may result 
in fewer negative economic externalities than shifting to a stakeholder-centric 
model. Perhaps the biggest strength of Corporate Friction is Yosifon’s discussion 
of the latter, while its glaring weakness is minimal discussion of the former. 
Te remainder of this review discusses in more detail the strengths and 
weaknesses of Yosifon’s take on the four primary assumptions that underline the 
argument for a shift from a shareholder-centric to stakeholder-centric model of 
corporate governance. 
15. See e.g. Frederick Post, “Te Social Responsibility of Management: A Critique of the 
Shareholder Paradigm and Defence of Stakeholder Primacy” (2003) 18 Mid-Am J Bus 57. 
16. Tis premise is not universally accepted in the scholarship. Yosifon dedicates a signifcant 
portion of his book to developing an argument for why this is the case. See generally Yosifon, 
supra note 1 at 61-95. 
17. “Negative externalities” refers to external costs that are borne by third parties opposed to 
the cost creator. 
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Yosifon’s frst assertion, that American corporate governance law requires 
directors to solely consider shareholder interests,18  is not a given in corporate 
legal theory. Many critics of the stakeholder-primacy argument assert that U.S. 
law, as it stands, already permits directors to consider other stakeholders.19 Tis 
is supported in cases where courts have upheld directors’ decisions to make 
considerable charitable donations without violating their fduciary duties.20  
Yosifon efectively rebuts these assertions by exploring the case law wherein 
the legality of these actions is afrmed by courts. Yosifon notes that each of the 
afrmations are prefaced by acknowledgment that the charitable or political 
actions were performed with the purpose of increasing shareholder value through 
improved relationships with stakeholders.21  In doing so, Yosifon distinguishes 
between actions and purposes of corporate directors. Yosifon’s argument is rooted 
in this distinction between actions and purpose. Te American corporate 
governance regime permits actions that promote stakeholder best-interests, but 
only if they are done with the purpose of promoting shareholder best interests 
(i.e., profts).22  In order to achieve the desired social progress associated with a 
shift to a stakeholder-primacy model of corporate governance, Yosifon asserts 
that the law must be extended to require directors to put stakeholder interests 
frst, or at least on equal footing with shareholders in certain situations where the 
proposed actions may not be in the best interest of shareholders.23  Tis represents 
a change in the purpose of director decision-making, as opposed to just extending 
the allowable actions available to directors. 
Te above distinction, between scenarios where stakeholders and shareholders 
are aligned and those where they are conficted, represents the second premise of 
Yosifon’s argument: the shareholder-primacy model creates negative externalities 
for external stakeholders when stakeholder and shareholder goals are distinct.24  
One of the common arguments in support of the current shareholder-primacy 
model is that directors will necessarily consider other stakeholders (e.g., 
18. Yosifon, supra note 1 at 17. 
19. See e.g. Lymna Johnson & David Millon, “Corporate Law After Hobby Law” (2014) 70 
Bus Lawyer 1; David Millon, “Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility” (2011) 46 
Wake Forest L Rev 523; Christopher M Bruner, “Corporate Governance in a Time of Crisis” 
(2011) 36 J Corp L 309; Andrew S Gold, “Teories of the Firm and Judicial Uncertainty” 
(2012) 35 Seattle UL Rev 1087. Yosifon specifcally references and rebukes these critics in the 
fourth chapter of his book. See Yosifon, supra note 1 at 72-74, 80-82. 
20. See e.g. Teodora Holding Corp v Henderson, A (2d) 398 (Del Ch 1969). 
21. Yosifon, supra note 1 at 85-87, 91-92. 
22. Ibid at 61-95. 
23. Ibid at 177-78. 
24. Ibid at 18-19, 138-39. 






employees, the environment, and consumers) when acting in the best interest of 
shareholders, as positive long-term stakeholder relationships will drive long-term 
profts for shareholders.25 Yosifon acknowledges that this is often the scenario 
in the shareholder-primacy model, but makes it clear that his work is focused 
on eliminating the exceptions where this is not the case.26 He uses events such 
as the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the Volkswagen Emissions Scandal,27 and 
the decision to close domestic factories in favour of outsourcing production to 
jurisdictions with weaker labour standards, as examples of times where external 
stakeholders bore, and continue to bear, the cost of corporate director decisions 
to prioritize short term profts.28 You would be hard-pressed to fnd a corporate 
governance scholar, even those stoutly in favour of shareholder-primacy, that does 
not believe these negative externalities exist in a shareholder-primacy corporate 
governance system. Te ongoing debate concerns the extent to which negative 
externalities can be eliminated with changes to the shareholder-primacy corporate 
governance framework, and whether a shift to a stakeholder-centric model may 
reduce some of the positive externalities created by the shareholder-centric model. 
Critics of the stakeholder-primacy model that Yosifon defends argue that 
there are alternative methods to efectively minimize negative externalities without 
removing the economic benefts of shareholder-centric corporate governance 
regimes.29 Perhaps Yosifon’s strongest contribution to corporate governance legal 
theory is his strong refutation of each of these claims. One of the most commonly 
supported alternative mechanisms is the use of non-corporate regulations, 
such as labour laws and environmental laws, to control corporate behaviour.30 
Te argument is that the purpose of corporate law is to promote efciency 
and efectiveness of business entities, and any resulting negative externalities 
that outweigh the benefts should be individually dealt with using legislation 
external to corporate charter regulation. Yosifon argues, however, that diferent 
stakeholders are not on equal footing with corporations to lobby for changes to 
25. Yosifon refers to this as the “Pareto fallacy of corporate proftability” and discusses it at length 
in chapter 2. Ibid at 18, citing Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 5th ed, (Wolters 
Kluwer Law & Business, 2007). 
26. Yosifon, supra note 1 at 18-19. 
27. Te Volkswagen Emissions Scandal refers to Volkswagen’s use of vehicle software to 
evade environmental emissions standards. See Russell Hotten, “Volkswagen: Te 
Scandal explained” (10 December 2015), online: BBC News <www.bbc.com/news/ 
business-34324772>. 
28. Yosifon, supra note 1 at 17, 146-47, 154. 
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legislation.31 Te legal benefts granted to corporations via corporate law place 
them in a superior position to accumulate wealth, compared with individuals. 
Based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United protecting corporate 
political advertisements under free speech rights,32 corporations, according to 
Yosifon, are in a superior position to accumulate wealth and use it to lobby 
for legislation that will promote corporate (shareholder) interests.33 Yosifon 
does not, however, argue that Citizens United should be overruled and that the 
United States should adopt legislation similar to that of comparable foreign 
jurisdictions which limit corporate political speech. He argues that free speech, 
including corporate political speech, is paramount to the functioning of liberal 
democracies.34 He proposes that the most efective way to resolve this dilemma 
is to change corporate law so as to require that corporations use their political 
lobbying power to promote the interests of all stakeholders.35 
Te second common alternative to stakeholder-primacy regimes that 
advocates of shareholder rights allude to, is the ability of markets, particularly 
labour and consumer markets, to monitor corporate behaviour and punish 
corporations that sacrifce stakeholder interests in favour of shareholder 
profts.36 Based on this theory, frms that put shareholder profts ahead of their 
employees or customers will lose talented employees and future sales, thereby 
reducing corporate profts. Accordingly, the ability of labour and consumer 
markets to utilize their market power to control corporate behaviour will align 
the best-interests of shareholders with those of other stakeholders. To rebut this 
argument, Yosifon cleverly draws on similar logic that has traditionally been used 
to support a shareholder-primacy corporate governance model. He argues that the 
ability of consumer and labour markets to control corporate behaviour requires 
the complete dissemination of information between all parties.37 Te same 
agency argument, which cites information asymmetry between shareholders and 
managers as the driving force behind shareholder-centric regimes, is extended 
to external consumers and employees to support a stakeholder-centric regime. 
Yosifon argues that there is an inherent agency problem that impacts the ability 
of workers and consumers to assert their market power, based on the control of 
31. Ibid at 32. 
32. Citizens United v Federal Elections Commission, 130 S Ct 876 (2010) [Citizens United]. 
33. Yosifon, supra note 1 at 42-44. 
34. Ibid at 41-44. 
35. Ibid at 38-39, 56. 
36. Ibid at 26-28. 
37. Ibid at 22. 








corporations over the information that they provide to external stakeholders.38 
Under the stakeholder-primacy regime put forth in Corporate Friction, a corporate 
director’s fduciary duty should be extended to external stakeholders in order to 
overcome the agency problem associated with asymmetric information between 
corporations and their external stakeholders.39 
As noted above, there are two key assumptions required to support a 
transition from a shareholder-centric to stakeholder-centric model of corporate 
governance. Te frst is that the negative externalities eliminated by the shift to 
a stakeholder-primacy approach are not ofset by reduced positive externalities 
associated with shareholder-primacy governance models. Second, there are no 
alternative methods that more efectively balance these competing interests. 
Yosifon convincingly discusses why alternative theoretical models of 
corporate accountability are inefective at reducing the negative externalities 
associated with shareholder-primacy.40 Upon doing so, however, he errs in his 
inference that this is sufcient to support the conclusion that a stakeholder-centric 
model should be implemented without considering the stand-alone merits of his 
recommendation. Tis is not coherent. Even if a reader accepts his argument that 
a stakeholder-primacy model is the best way to reduce the negative externalities 
associated with shareholder-centric corporate governance regimes, this does 
not entail the conclusion that it is necessary to adopt such a model. Advocates 
of the current shareholder-primacy model do not necessarily assert that there 
are no external costs to the system, but rather that the positive externalities of 
the system that promote job creation, lower cost of capital, and increased tax 
revenue outweigh the external costs.41 Supporters of external (non-corporate law) 
solutions to corporate law’s negative externalities do not view them as preferential 
solely because they are more efective at reducing negative externalities than 
stakeholder-primacy models, but because they can more efectively address 
the concerns without eliminating the positive externalities associated with 
shareholder-centric corporate governance regimes.42 
Te argument that the United States should abandon its shareholder 
primacy model in favour of a stakeholder-centric model requires an attempt 
to quantify the net benefts and costs (economically and socially) of shifting 
38. Ibid at 129-30. 
39. Ibid at 177-78. 
40. See generally, ibid, c 1-2. 
41. See e.g. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “Te End of History for Corporate Law” 
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corporate governance regimes. Tis discussion, particularly regarding economic 
efects, is missing from Corporate Friction. While Yosifon acknowledges the 
potential for a reduction in positive economic benefts, his primary response is 
that foreign capital markets have adopted a more stakeholder-centric approach 
to corporate governance and still maintain strong capital and labour markets and 
even report stable foreign investment from U.S. investors.43 In his discussion of 
foreign markets, Yosifon acknowledges the diferent normative cultural regimes, 
historically developed in each jurisdiction, that place them in a unique position to 
adopt a multi-stakeholder approach to corporate governance.44 In his discussion 
of how foreign multi-stakeholder regimes can be used as evidence that a similar 
regime can be successfully implemented in the United States, however, Yosifon 
fails to discuss how specifc U.S. cultural diferences may infuence the extent to 
which a shift in corporate governance law will have a difering impact on U.S. 
economic progress compared to foreign jurisdictions.45 
In addition to possible diferences in economic efects, entrenched corporate 
legal and cultural norms may inhibit the ability of U.S. corporations to efectively 
implement a multi-stakeholder corporate governance regime in a manner that 
reduces the negative externalities that Yosifon is targeting in his recommended 
corporate governance system. To account for cultural diferences, the United States 
would likely need a customized stakeholder-centric corporate governance regime 
that is integrated with the existing legal system and diferent from comparable 
foreign alternatives. Yosifon proposes a system whereby directors are required to 
equally weigh the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders, with a strong 
deference accorded to the business judgment of directors in court challenges.46 
While simple in theory, the application is complex. Yosifon’s proposed system 
of stakeholder-primacy paired with director deference creates an inherent 
risk that directors with engrained opinions on the importance of shareholder 
primacy, whose decisions will be protected under the business judgment rule, 
will continue to prioritize shareholder interests. It may also have the efect of 
magnifying the problem if shareholders use their voting power to elect directors 
with a pro-shareholder mindset. Under a worst-case scenario, this may result in a 
corporate legal regime whereby the de jure corporate governance laws increase the 
43. Yosifon, supra note 1 at 185, 197. 
44. Ibid at 148, 166. 
45. For example, as noted by Yosifon, U.S. corporate shares are more likely to be widely held 
and the concept of shareholder-primacy has been entrenched in U.S. market culture. 
Ibid at 165-67. 
46. Ibid at 178. 




shareholder agency problem and deter investment, but the de facto application of 
directors’ business judgment will still prioritize shareholder interests and create 
negative externalities for external stakeholders. Tis could result in a governance 
model where litigation and legal costs increase, but no substantive changes are 
made in favour of external stakeholders. 
My introduction of the worst-case results of Yosifon’s recommendation is 
not meant to assert that Yosifon’s ideas on corporate governance are incorrect. 
I am unwilling to go so far as to say that a multi-stakeholder approach to 
corporate governance would result in more harm than good. Instead, my assertion 
is that any argument recommending that the United States abandon its 
longstanding position that shareholder-primacy is the ideal model of corporate 
governance in favour of a multi-stakeholder approach, must be supported by 
a full cost-beneft analysis that considers both economic and social objectives 
in the context of the unique U.S. economic and cultural history. Corporate 
Friction ofers a well-thought-out critique of the shareholder-primacy model of 
corporate governance, but its limited economic analysis prevents it from acting 
as a stand-alone argument that supports rejecting the current shareholder-centric 
regime in favour of a stakeholder-primacy legal governance model, as Yosifon 
intends. Te net result is that Corporate Friction presents a valuable contribution 
to the current debate on the role of corporate law in promoting societal progress, 
but it should be read as one element of this debate—not as the fnal answer. 
